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North Korea and Identity Politics in  
 South Korea
A  , S K President Lee Myung Bak proclaimed that 
his country “must move from the age of ideology into the age of pragmatism.”2 At a 
time when South Korean voters were fatigued by outgoing President Roh’s particular 
brand of politics heavily steeped in ideology, Lee’s image as an eff ective, non-ideologi-
cal manager had proved appealing. 1 ough during the campaign Lee had vowed to 
strengthen the alliance with the United States and to insist on greater conditionality 
in inter-Korean relations, these issues were not the headlines of the 2007 presidential 
contest—in sharp contrast to the previous one. In fact, they received little traction. 
Instead, economic issues had top billing and Lee won based on economic promises. 
In a sense, this zeitgeist represents a departure from the previous 10 years of Korean 
politics, when the reassessment of the South Korea’s relationships with North Korea 
and the United States were central and divisive issues. 
Yet, it would be imprudent to declare the demise of identity politics in South 
Korea. As Suh asserts, the country has been “caught between two confl icting identities: 
the alliance identity that sees the United States as a friendly provider and the national-
ist identity that pits Korean identity against the United States.”3 Sharp division and 
disputes over the North and the alliance will not disappear in the near future because, 
for Koreans, these issues are intimately related to the basic and contested question of 
national identity. In fact, as clearly displayed during his fi rst visit to Washington in 
April 2008, Lee’s “pragmatic” policy is fi rmly grounded in the “alliance” identity and 
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has already provoked strong reaction from progressive forces that have promoted the 
nationalist identity.4 
Using newly collected data from the South Korean media, this article examines 
diff ering South Korean views of the North from 1992 to 2003, the critical time of 
the post–cold war era, during which traditional notions of national identity have been 
challenged. While signifi cant attention has been paid to how diff ering U.S. and South 
Korean perceptions of the North led to strains in the alliance, less is known about how 
these issues have been discussed, debated, and contested within the South, as well as 
why this fractious national debate has been laden with such intensity and emotion.5 
We need to understand how these debates were related to eff orts to (re)conceptualize 
South Korean identity vis-à-vis two principal “signifi cant others”—the North and the 
United States—and how identity politics will continue to shape alliance relations as 
well as inter-Korean relations.6 
Our central argument is that while U.S. offi  cials approach North Korea principally 
as a matter of policy, North Korea and inter-Korean relations have been fundamental 
to the evolution of South Korean national identity in this new era. South Koreans, led 
by liberals,7 have sought to redefi ne their national identity in the newly forged and 
evolving regional and global orders of the post–cold war era, and the North lies at the 
heart of the process. In the Korean context, identity politics involving the North takes 
on a special meaning, due to the rather peculiar circumstance of a nation with a strong 
sense of ethnic homogeneity being divided into two political entities. 1 roughout their 
post-1945 history, this shared sense of ethnic identity within discrete political systems 
has caused the governments of the two Koreas to contest rightful political leadership 
of the conceived national community. At present, we witness the same agreement on 
ethnic unity and disagreement over the political notion of nation within South Korea. 
Ethnic nationalism and the unique bitterness associated with in-group disagreement 
over identity must be properly considered in understanding identity politics involving 
the North in South Korea.
Deep division in the South over the North means that the United States faces 
distinct policy challenges in coordinating with a government—whether conservative or 
liberal—that represents a starkly divided polity. 1 ough there has been much optimism 
regarding Lee’s election and prospects for improved cooperation between the United 
States and South Korea, it must be emphasized that this event has happened within a 
transformed political context and does not represent a return to a mythical “golden age” 
of the past. 1 e United States must consider the interests associated with both identities 
and should be wary of creating hasty expectations for dramatic changes in South Korea 
as a result of this power shift. While Washington works closely with the new conserva-
tive government in Seoul, it must reach out to progressive forces as well.
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SOUTH KOREA’S POLITICS OF IDENTITY8 
1 e North is undoubtedly an important element in South Korea’s conception of 
national identity. Koreans (on both sides) have traditionally shared a strong sense of 
ethnic homogeneity, a dynamic that remains today.9 However, the post-1945 territorial 
division created the “unnatural” situation of the single Korean family being divided into 
two parts. Both sides claimed the legitimate right to represent the entire ethnic Korean 
community, appropriating a particular ideology—anticolonialism/anti-imperialism in 
the North and liberalism/anti-Communism in the South—and linking these respective 
ideologies to national identity. In both Koreas, contention over national representa-
tion was framed as a struggle between patriots and traitors to the “true” nation, with 
the “Other” portrayed as catering to the interests of “foreign imperialists” (either the 
United States or the Soviet Union). 
1 e late 1980s brought important structural changes. Internally, South Korea un-
derwent democratization, and externally, it witnessed the collapse of the Soviet empire. 
In the post–cold war context, the power of anti-Communism as a unifying political 
ideology was weakened, and the Korean government pursued a “Northern” policy, 
normalizing relations with former “enemies,” notably Russia and China. However, the 
cold war structure on the peninsula did not crumble like its European counterparts, 
and South Korean views of the North were still largely negative. Nonetheless, in a 
democratizing South, the authoritarian state-sanctioned “anti-Communist” identity 
faced serious challenges from a developing civil society, which diversifi ed discourse on 
a number of issues ranging from unifi cation with the North to the U.S.–South Korea 
alliance. 1 e question of national identity came to the fore, provoking an intense and 
emotional contest between the authoritarian state and a burgeoning civil society. Once 
again, there was a struggle to represent the “true” Korean national community, this 
time within the South. 
A turning point in South Korea’s policy toward the North occurred with Kim 
Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” South Koreans in the 1990s were increasingly concerned 
about the prospect of heavy fi nancial burdens if a hasty reunifi cation occurred, having 
seen the “costly” unifi cation process of Germany. 1 e Sunshine Policy was inspired by 
this new thinking. Supporters argued that it would be prudent to stretch out “peace-
ful co-existence” for a lengthy period during which the North’s economy could be 
strengthened to minimize the fi nancial consequences of eventual reunifi cation. Kim’s 
Sunshine Policy separated business from politics and advocated economic aid to the 
North to encourage its eff orts at reform. It led to the historic inter-Korean summit in 
the summer of 2000 in Pyongyang. While its tangible outcomes were modest, it was 
instrumental in transforming many South Korean views of the North from enemy to 
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partner. 
1 e policy, however, provoked a strong reaction from conservatives in the South. 
1 ough not necessarily opposed to engagement, conservative forces were skeptical that 
the North would change, and they demanded greater reciprocity.10,11 In their view, the 
North Korean threat had not diminished, and the pursuit of rapprochement seemed 
disconcerting at best. 1 e bitter contention between progressives and conservatives 
in South Korea on the North Korea issue has been referred to as the “South-South 
confl ict” or “a house divided.”12 1 e engagement policy, furthered by the Roh govern-
ment, has also clashed with the Bush administration’s tough policy stance on North 
Korea, straining U.S.–South Korea relations. Once again, this new assertion of national 
identity should be understood within the larger framework of South Koreans, led by 
liberals, actively seeking to (re)defi ne their position vis-à-vis their northern half and 
foreign powers like the United States. 
DATA AND METHOD
1 is article is based on the analysis of editorials and columns on North Korea published 
in two major newspapers, Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh.13 1 ese newspapers serve as good 
proxies, respectively, for conservative and progressive views in the country regarding 
the North and inter-Korean relations. Public opinion research has shown that the news 
media often set the agenda for public discussion of key policy issues and that exposure 
to news can signifi cantly infl uence public opinion on foreign policy issues as well as 
perceptions of other nations.14,15 Indeed, experts on Korean aff airs view South Korean 
media outlets as political actors whose explicit “campaigns” for or against particular 
issues have partially contributed to South Koreans’ shifting perceptions of the North 
(and the United States).16 1 rough this examination, we can assess the importance that 
both conservatives and liberals assign to issues relating to the North and how this has 
changed in accordance with events and politics, especially since the implementation 
of the sunshine policy. In a similar way, we can evaluate their respective tones toward 
key issues and policies related to the North and inter-Korean relations. In this article, 
we use newly collected data consisting of a total of 1,084 editorials and columns about 
North Korea, published from July 1992 to July 2003 in Chosun (597) and Hankyoreh 
(487). 
THE NORTH IN SOUTH KOREAN NEWS
THE PRIMACY OF INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
1 e interest of both the conservative and liberal media lies not so much in the North 
Shin and Burke.indd   290 11/2/08   5:10:21 PM
North Korea and Identity Politics in South Korea 
F/W 2008 •  ,  
291
itself but in its relations with other nations, especially the South. As Figure 1 shows, the 
majority (60 percent) of editorials and columns in both newspapers focused on inter-
Korean relations and nearly 20 percent covered U.S.–North Korea relations. In contrast, 
there was comparatively little interest in North Korea itself at only 8 percent.17 
Figure 1: North Korea Coverage by Focus Cateories
1 ese data (composed of editorials and op-ed columns) illustrate that the primary 
question facing the South Korean people has not been in defi ning the nature of its 
northern neighbor but rather in formulating an appropriate response to the precari-
ous situation there. In the post–cold war years, the nature of the northern regime and 
the challenges it faces have become quite clear; both conservatives and liberals see a 
government with an underdeveloped economy that struggles to feed its people while 
channeling resources to nuclear and military programs. 1 e study period includes 
President Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy, including the inter-Korean summit, and 
two nuclear crises. 1 ese developments spurred a great deal of discussion and debate 
within the South about inter-Korean relations and U.S.–North Korea relations, as these 
relationships will infl uence the future of the peninsula.
SECURITY AND POLITICS OVERSHADOW ECONOMY
What issues do the South Korean media address in editorial coverage of inter-Korean 
relations? Figure 2 details the amount of attention the two newspapers devoted to issues 
within the category of inter-Korean relations over the study period. Naturally, peace 
and unifi cation captured a large share of newspapers’ attention (23 percent).18 As one 
might expect, coverage of this issue spiked in 2000 in the wake of the historic inter-
Korean summit and remained relatively high in 2001. In addition, both newspapers 
published signifi cant numbers of editorials and columns on North Korea’s impact on 
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East Asian security within their coverage of inter-Korean relations (22 percent). 1 is 
is understandable, as this study period covers two nuclear crises, the North’s 1998 
missile test over Japan, and military confl ict between the two Koreas in the West Sea 
(Yellow Sea). 1 e threat presented by the North is a point of fervent debate in South 
Korean society, with conservatives focusing on Pyongyang’s continuing threat and 
dangerous drive for asymmetric capabilities while progressives tend to see its sometimes 
provocative behavior as an outcome of U.S. policy and largely confi ned to the context 
of U.S.–North Korea relations. 1 ese diff ering views have an impact on how liberals 
and conservatives conceptualize inter-Korean relations.19
Humanitarian and human rights issues ranked as the third largest coverage cat-
egory, making up 19 percent of inter-Korean relations news. From the liberal perspective, 
humanitarian aid is essential to saving the North’s starving population and improving 
inter-Korean relations. In contrast, conservatives are concerned that aid may not go to 
those in greatest need and may also strengthen the autocratic regime. With regard to 
human rights, while liberal South Korean governments pursued economic initiatives 
they hoped would lead to development and better human rights conditions, believing 
that publicly pressing human rights issues would be counterproductive, conservative 
forces accused the government of “appeasement” for its silence on the oppression of their 
“brethren” in the North. President Lee’s recent promise to the international community 
to confront the issue of human rights in North Korea more directly refl ects conservative 
attempts to correct what they see as failed liberal policies on this issue.20 
Despite the controversy over the role the human rights issue should play in Seoul’s 
approach to inter-Korean relations, it is important to emphasize that South Koreans tend 
to view the issue in particular terms, focusing on the suff ering of Korean people—their 
people—as both conservative and liberal newspapers use terms like “compatriots,” 
“brethren,” “brothers,” 
and “miserable victims 
of national division.” In 
contrast, U.S. leaders tend 
to conceptualize the situ-
ation in North Korea in 
more universal terms, focusing on violations of human rights by the “authoritarian” 
and “evil” state or regime. 21 1 is diff erence in Korean and U.S. perceptions has been 
translated into diff ering policies toward North Korea. 1 is includes the South’s approach 
of economic engagement and aid, intended to alleviate the suff ering of “brothers and 
sisters,” as compared to the U.S. tendency to isolate and punish a regime engaged in 
the practices of torture, forced labor, and prohibition of religious freedom. 
U.S. leaders tend to conceptualize the situa-
tion in North Korea in more universal terms, 
focusing on violations of human rights by the 
“authoritarian” and “evil” state or regime.
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Figure 2. Topics in Coverage on Inter-Korean Relations
It is interesting to note that although two liberal South Korean governments held 
up economic cooperation as the backbone of burgeoning inter-Korean relations—with 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex and South Korean tourism to Mt. Kumkang portrayed 
by progressive forces as the most tangible successes of engagement—Figure 2 illustrates 
that economic and trade issues received little coverage. Chosun and Hankyoreh accorded 
only 9 percent of inter-Korean opinion pieces to this issue, the smallest volume of 
coverage of any of the major inter-Korean issue categories. As might be anticipated, 
coverage of economic issues rose in the wake of the 2000 summit, with the progressive 
newspaper according more attention to these types of developments than the conserva-
tive newspaper. Overall, it is clear that political and security aspects (i.e., the summit, 
nuclear programs, etc.) of inter-Korean relations are more visible in editorial coverage, 
as these issues elicit greater public interest, emotion, and debate. 
Figure 3 shows changes in media attention to security and economic issues over the 
course of the study period, allowing us to examine more closely the disparity in coverage 
between these two sets of issues. From 1992 through 1999, we note a very low—nearly 
non-existent—level of conservative and progressive interest in North Korean economic 
and trade issues. Economic and trade coverage peaked in the summit year of 2000 (14 
for Hankyoreh and 9 for Chosun) and remained above pre-summit levels for the rest of 
the study period. Yet overall, the volume of economic coverage pales in comparison 
to that of North Korea’s impact on regional security, and the discrepancy in North 
Korean–related economic and security coverage increased in post-summit years.22 
While the surge in security coverage during 2002 and 2003 refl ects the second 
nuclear crisis, the general disparity between economic and security coverage suggests 
three things. First, it may be the case that there had been less disagreement between 
conservatives and liberals on economic and trade issues; therefore, these issues have 
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received less editorial coverage overall. In fact, as shown below (Table 2), economic 
and trade issues seemed to be one of the least polarizing issue categories. 1 e fact that 
the actual amount of economic cooperation was small—both in absolute terms and 
especially as a portion of the South Korean economy—may also have contributed to 
this relative lack of attention. Moreover, it may be suggested that despite the South 
Korean government’s attempts to focus on economic engagement, the profundity and 
primacy of the security situation was inescapable. As such, security issues dominated the 
opinion pages in both publications, which took starkly diff erent positions on the nature 
of the North’s threat and the best policy approach. An infl amed security situation on the 
peninsula—especially in the face of a second nuclear crisis—constrained the ability of 
South Korean governments to pursue improvements in inter-Korean relations (includ-
ing new economic projects) and diverted public attention away from economic and 
cultural matters. Indeed, a second inter-Korean summit had been deemed impossible 
until North Korea appeared to be making some progress on denuclearization; President 
Roh Moo-Hyun was only able to travel to Pyongyang in late 2007, after North Korea 
had shut down the Yongbyon reactor, permitted inspections, and pledged complete 
denuclearization. 1 us, the security situation not only overshadows economic news 
but actually prevents strides in inter-Korean economic and trade relations.
Figure 3. Security and Economy Coverage over Time.  (Note: 1992 and 2003 are weighted).
CONTENTION AND PERCEPTION GAP
1 e North Korean issue became more contentious and divisive in the latter years of this 
study. As Figure 4 presents, South Korean coverage of the North increased considerably 
from the late 1990s, with the most dramatic increase in 2000, the year of the historic 
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inter-Korean summit, when Chosun coverage more than doubled and Hankyoreh cover-
age increased by over four times over the previous year.23 1 ough this increased volume 
was not sustainable, for every year after the summit, coverage remained above pre-sum-
mit levels. 1 e Kim Dae Jung government’s eff orts to establish inter-Korean political 
and economic ties and the ensuing society-wide debate on how to handle the volatility 
of inter-Korean relations placed these matters on the editorial pages of newspapers far 
more often. As shown in Figure 4, temporal changes in these two ideologically polar-
ized publications align quite closely, suggesting that progressives and conservatives are 
engaged in a fi erce debate over North Korea–related issues, which is part of a larger 
struggle to defi ne national identity vis-à-vis this signifi cant “other.”  
Figure 4. North Korea Coverage over Time. (Note: 1992 and 2003 are weighted).
As the North Korean issue became more contentious, South Korean views have 
become sharply divided. As Table 1 illustrates, there are marked disparities between the 
two newspapers’ average tones toward North Korea-related issues.24 Chosun is clearly 
negative on inter-Korean relations (-0.62), while Hankyoreh is actually positive (0.04), 
on average. 1 e disparity demonstrates that during the study period, Korean conser-
vatives remained skeptical of prospects for inter-Korean relations despite aggressive 
engagement by the South. We observe a similarly notable diff erence in their respective 
tones toward the North (-0.69 for Chosun and 0.03 for Hankyoreh). While neither 
group may dispute the characterization of North Korea as a failing regime, this fi nding 
demonstrates liberals’ tendency toward more sympathetic discourse, while conservatives 
voice more critical rhetoric.
Both newspapers reveal their most negative average tone ratings in the category 
of  U.S.–North Korea relations, wherein—unlike other categories—there is virtually no 
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inter-newspaper diff erence (-0.71 for Chosun and -0.68 for Hankyoreh). 1 is suggests 
that during these years both conservatives and liberals were quite pessimistic about 
U.S.–North Korea relations—not surprising given that the study period includes two 
nuclear crises. Yet, despite similar scores, the newspapers have come to this shared 
pessimism through diff ering assessments—the conservative newspaper predominantly 
blamed the northern regime for poor U.S.–North Korea relations, while the liberal 
newspaper most often reproached the United States for such tension. 
Chosun Hankyoreh Overall
Inter-Korea -0.62 0.04 -0.31
U.S.–North Korea -0.71 -0.68 -0.70
North Korea -0.69 0.03 -0.35
Average -0.60 -0.14 -0.39
Table 1. Average Tones toward Focus Categories
Table 2 presents average tones on the fi ve most frequently editorialized issues 
within the category of inter-Korean relations. As expected, Chosun was more negative 
than Hankyoreh on all fi ve categories, with especially negative tones toward security, 
South Korean politics, and humanitarian issues. Indeed, there were signifi cant dispari-
ties between the two newspapers in nearly all issues, indicative of a highly contentious 
political landscape. It is not surprising that the category of “North Korea and East Asia 
Security” yielded highly negative coverage in both newspapers, as the study period en-
compasses many critical security-related events, such as the two nuclear crises, numerous 
missile tests, and various small-scale North-South military clashes. It is, however, note-
worthy that both newspapers recorded quite negative ratings on South Korean politics 
(within the context of inter-Korean relations). In fact, Hankyoreh’s most negative tone in 
any category is found here. Conservatives have long been critical of what they consider 
the liberal administrations’ manipulation of inter-Korean issues for political gain. As 
recently as 2007, conservative forces accused President Roh of scheduling the second 
inter-Korean summit directly before the presidential election in order to give a politi-
cal boost to progressive forces. Yet, these negative tone ratings on national politics run 
deeper, as each side’s politics is connected to its respective identity. Each side strongly 
believes that it has the correct prescription for the terms on which inter-Korean rela-
tions should be pursued, and these beliefs—grounded in identity, vis-à-vis the North 
and the United States—do not yield easily to political compromise.  
It is interesting to note that though a signifi cant disparity existed between con-
servative and liberal editorial tone scores on peace and unifi cation, Chosun’s tone is 
only mildly negative at -0.31. 1 is suggests that even conservatives tend not to criticize 
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the goals of peace and unifi cation, but rather the methods and priorities that liberal 
governments have employed in attempting to move closer to realizing these aspirations. 
Even in the presence of starkly diff erentiated conservative and liberal identities, the 
establishment of a peace regime and eventual unifi cation are broadly held goals. In-
deed, in the lead-up to the June 2000 summit, the Kim Dae Jung government received 
much praise from the conservative press.25 1 e establishment of a peace regime and 
eventual unifi cation continue to be important, broadly-held ideas. 1 ough they may 
not be buttressed by the same levels of optimism and hope, adherence to these ideals 
has become “politically correct,” even a marker of Korean patriotism. Indeed, the fact 
that both newspapers accord more positive (or less negative) tone ratings to peace and 
unifi cation than to inter-Korean relations in general supports this point. 
Chosun Hankyoreh Overall
Topic
 Peace and Unifi cation -0.31 0.41 0.03
 North Korea and East Asia Security -1.09 -0.36 -0.81
 Humanitarian/Human Rights Issues -0.71 -0.04 -0.44
 Economy/Trade -0.16 0.38 0.16
 South Korean Politics -1.18 -0.61 -0.80
Table 2. Average Tones for Inter-Korean Relations by Topic Categories
U.S.–NORTH KOREA RELATIONS AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
Finally, our fi ndings demonstrate that U.S.–North Korea relations signifi cantly aff ect 
inter-Korean relations. Figure 5 depicts the two newspapers’ tones toward inter-Korean 
relations during four combinations of U.S. and South Korean administrations. 1 e 
Clinton–Kim Dae Jung years recorded the most positive tone ratings in both newspapers. 
1 ese years not only included the inter-Korean summit but also featured signifi cant 
improvements in U.S.–North Korea relations, evidenced by high-level dialogue and 
reciprocal visits. 
In contrast, the Clinton–Kim Young Sam and Bush–Roh Moo Hyun years 
recorded more negative tone ratings. Each of these periods included a nuclear crisis, 
which seems to have infl uenced both newspapers’ views on prospects for inter-Korean 
relations. Indeed, during the fi rst nuclear crisis, Chosun’s tone toward inter-Korean 
relations was -0.31, and during the second nuclear crisis its tone was -0.48. However, 
during years not characterized by nuclear crisis, this conservative publication’s tone 
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toward inter-Korean relations averaged -0.26. A similar dynamic is also evident in the 
liberal Hankyoreh, wherein tone toward inter-Korean relations was 0.05 during the fi rst 
nuclear crisis, -0.01 during the second nuclear crisis, and 0.19 during years when there 
was no nuclear crisis. 1 us, both newspapers are more positive (or less negative) on 
inter-Korean relations in the absence of security tensions. 1 us, our fi nding demon-
strates that security tensions on the peninsula, especially tensions largely perceived to 
be “U.S.–North Korea problems,” such as the two nuclear crises, dull both liberal and 
conservative hopes for progress in inter-Korean relations. In other words, inter-Korean 
relations are bounded by the security situation on the peninsula, especially by tensions 
in U.S.–North Korea relations. 
1 e data in Figure 5 provide the basis for additional interesting observations. Cho-
sun recorded its most negative tone rating during the Clinton–Kim Young Sam years, 
while Hankyoreh’s most negative tone toward inter-Korean relations occurred during 
the Bush-Roh years. 1 e Kim Young Sam government took a tough line toward North 
Korea and was not satisfi ed with the Clinton administration’s response to the North’s 
“hostile” behavior. In response to North Korea’s actions from its announcement of 
withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty to its September 1996 submarine incur-
sion into the South, the Kim government and South Korean conservatives viewed the 
United States’ “soft” response toward the North as appeasement.26 1 e combination of 
the North’s hostile behavior and U.S.–South Korea disagreement led conservatives to 
evaluate prospects for inter-Korean relations in very negative terms during the overlap 
of the Sam and Clinton administrations. In contrast, during the Bush-Roh years, 
the U.S.–North Korea confrontation over a presumed uranium enrichment program 
coupled with U.S. tactics of isolation and punishment caused a clash between the lib-
eral Korean government and the Bush administration and hindered further progress in 
inter-Korean relations. In both these cases, inter-Korean relations seem to have been 
aff ected by heightened tension in U.S.–North Korea relations.
Recently, President Lee asserted that inter-Korean relations can only develop when 
the alliance is strong, in essence taking an inverse view of the causal variables in this 
complex triangular relationship. While President Roh resented the constraints that the 
nuclear issue put on inter-Korean relations but attempted to carry on with engagement, 
under the new Lee administration, the nuclear issue is not perceived as a frustrating 
hindrance. Rather, it is seen as a legitimate threat that necessarily upends engagement 
eff orts. Emblematic of the progressive response to the new administration’s approach, 
a Hankyoreh editorial recently criticized President Lee’s North Korea policy, asserting 
that he “might as well be declaring that no eff ort is going to be made in relations with 
the North until the nuclear issue is resolved.”27 
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Figure 5. Average Tones for Inter-Korean Relations: U.S.-South Korea Administration Combinations
FUTURE PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Whereas North Korea is viewed as a security issue in the United States, it is intimately 
linked to issues of identity in South Korea. As presented in this article, South Koreans 
generally perceive North Korea–related events within the context of inter-Korean 
relations, in accordance with a broadly held belief that someday the peninsula will be 
(re)unifi ed. 1 e North is therefore a “Korean” issue, inseparable from inter-Korean 
relations. A key question—hotly debated and immersed in identity politics—has 
been what approach to take toward the failing regime and the “suff ering” of northern 
“brethren.” 1 ough they seek diff erent policy approaches, both sides recognize the 
need for engagement, which is hard to reject given the strong sense of ethnic unity. 
Whereas progressives emphasize prioritizing inter-Korean collaboration, conservatives 
underline the need for greater reciprocity from the North. Each side believes that it 
has the correct prescription for the terms on which inter-Korean engagement should 
be pursued. Because these prescriptions are closely tied to identity, they do not yield 
easily to political compromise. 
1 is contention over the North must be understood in the larger context of the 
politics of national identity. 1 rough the collapse of the Soviet empire, democratization, 
and the implementation of the Sunshine Policy, Koreans, led by liberals, have sought to 
redefi ne their conceptions of national identity. 1 e North, viewed as a divided part of 
the same ethnic Korean nation, is intimately tied to this process. However, this process 
of redefi ning or reformulating national identity can be contentious and confl ict-rid-
den; during this study period, one group fi rmly retained the established identity and 
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another group reinterpreted relationships and events in forging a progressive identity. 
1 ese two stances, in direct contraposition, have hardened over time, especially since 
the implementation of the sunshine policy.28 Although the intensity of identity politics 
seems to have decreased over the past few years, a polity divided along these lines is 
likely to remain a durable feature of the Korean political landscape.
It is encouraging for U.S. policymakers that the Lee administration’s policy toward 
North Korea will be noticeably closer to the U.S. position.29 President Lee has indi-
cated he will stress denuclearization and employ more conditionality in inter-Korean 
relations, and he has not hesitated to raise uncomfortable issues, including the North’s 
human rights record. He has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the U.S.–South 
Korea alliance, and the “wave” of anti-Americanism associated with the beginning of 
the Roh administration seems to have passed. Indeed, according to a bipartisan group 
of former U.S. policymakers and experts on Korea, “South Korean popular protests 
against the United States in 2002 are an outdated image refl ecting a transitory set of 
circumstances at the time.”30 Yet even with the promise of more positive attitudes toward 
the United States and improved U.S.–South Korea policy coordination, the United 
States should be wary of creating unrealistic expectations of dramatic change in South 
Korean attitudes. Enduring contention over identity may still hinder the ability of the 
new Korean government to think and act strategically. 
In order to better secure long-term interests and continued cooperation, the United 
States must consider the interests associated with both identities (including how both 
sides perceive uncertainties about their region, such as the rise of China and new security 
roles for Japan), and acknowledge and be sensitive to the constraints a divided polity 
imposes on the Korean government. Although the voice of Korean progressives was 
weakened by defeat in the recent presidential and National Assembly elections, their 
perspective remains salient in Korean society, as we have witnessed recently by progres-
sive citizens’ and legislators’ ability to constrain the Lee government through popular 
protest and by preventing the National Assembly from convening. 1 eir views have 
become part of mainstream national politics, and this is something the United States 
cannot aff ord to overlook. Furthermore, the establishment of a conservative adminis-
tration may galvanize progressive forces to challenge its policy agenda. In this respect, 
the trade relationship with the United States, namely the beef issue, allowed an early 
opening. Additional challenges may be made to the Lee administration’s North Korea 
policy, especially if a famine in the North exposes what may be popularly perceived as 
relative government inaction on a critical humanitarian problem. In a sense, progres-
sives were contained and at times co-opted by the liberal governments of Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, accepting, albeit quite reluctantly, certain policies such as 
South Korean troop deployments to Iraq. In the face of a pro–United States conserva-
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tive administration, however, they are likely to be more aggressive in advancing their 
progressive views on the North and the United States, and such eff orts may even take 
an anti–U.S. tone. 1 is could mean a return to a more intense identity politics. While 
the United States works with the new conservative administration in Seoul, it must 
also reach out to progressive opposition forces.
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